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Tribute 
Tribute to David Stras: Under the 
Microscope 
Ryan W. Scott† 
In July 2010 my former professor and longtime collabora-
tor David Stras began service as an Associate Justice of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court. The nomination was an inspired 
choice, and a fitting tribute to Professor Stras could cover a lot 
of ground. As a scholar, he has quickly established himself as 
one of the nation’s brightest and most influential commentators 
on the U.S. Supreme Court and the federal judiciary. As a 
teacher, he received a Teacher of the Year award for his work 
in the classroom. As a mentor, to me and to countless other 
students, he has worked tirelessly as an advisor and advocate. 
A tribute to Professor Stras might praise his radio and televi-
sion analysis of the judicial appointments process, or his out-
standing Federal Courts casebook,1 or his commentary at the 
leading Supreme Court web site, SCOTUSblog.2 
But I want to focus, instead, on the rich irony of Professor 
Stras’s latest career move. After years of research on judicial 
decisionmaking, placing judges under the microscope, he has 
somehow managed to hop under the microscope himself. Before 
joining the court, he generated an impressive body of scholarly 
writing that scrutinizes and challenges judges’ decisions. He 
has cheerfully proposed methods of manipulating judges into 
leaving the bench.3 He has suggested increasing judges’ work-
 
†  Associate Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Bloo-
mington. Copyright © 2011 by Ryan W. Scott. 
 1. ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, LAUREN K. ROBEL & DAVID R. STRAS, FEDERAL 
COURTS (2d ed. 2009). 
 2. See, e.g., David Stras, The Politics of the Sotomayor Nomination, 
SCOTUSBLOG (May 31, 2009, 7:11 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/05/ 
the-politics-of-the-sotomayor-nomination. 
 3. David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a 
“Golden Parachute”, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1397 (2005). 
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load,4 while openly discussing whether to reduce their support 
staff.5 He has even questioned the constitutionality of senior 
status, the generous retirement program prized by the federal 
judiciary.6 Some of these excesses, no doubt, can be blamed on 
reckless and irresponsible coauthors. Still, after spending the 
better part of his career devising innovative ways of provoking 
judges, how did this guy become a judge himself? 
Professor Stras’s groundbreaking work on the judiciary de-
serves greater attention, not only because of its importance to 
scholars but because of what it reveals about his future as a 
justice. This Tribute summarizes three strands of Professor 
Stras’s scholarship—on judicial retirement incentives, the judi-
cial appointments process, and decisionmaking on the Supreme 
Court of the United States—that have proven especially in-
fluential. Although his writing frequently places judges under 
the microscope, it also reflects a profound respect for the work 
of the courts, and for the proper limits of the judiciary in the 
constitutional design. 
I.  JUDICIAL RETIREMENTS   
As other contributors to this Tribute have noted, Professor 
Stras’s early work focused on judicial retirement decisions, and 
in many ways charted the course of his later scholarship. In 
The Incentives Approach to Judicial Retirement,7 he proposed 
and developed a rational-choice decision model for judicial re-
tirements. Drawing upon research into judicial opinions, espe-
cially the attitudinal and rational-choice models of judicial de-
cisionmaking advanced by political scientists, Professor Stras 
contended that judges behave rationally in determining wheth-
er and when to retire.8 Recognizing that retirement decisions 
are rational, he argued, has important implications for policy-
 
 4. David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride Circuit 
Again, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1710 (2007).  
 5. David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law 
Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 947 (2007) (reviewing 
TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND 
INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006) and ARTEMUS WARD & 
DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2006)).  
 6. David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 
92 CORNELL L. REV. 453 (2007).  
 7. David R. Stras, The Incentives Approach to Judicial Retirement, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 1417 (2006).  
 8. Id. at 1431. 
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makers who hope to change judicial retirement patterns. Fixed-
term lengths, mandatory age limits, and similar direct meas-
ures for restricting judicial tenure are not the only options.9 
Equally viable, he contended, are indirect methods that alter 
judges’ incentives, for example by manipulating their retire-
ment income and workload.10 
Other articles developed and applied the incentives ap-
proach. In Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a “Golden Para-
chute”11 and a follow-up piece,12 Professor Stras and I weighed 
in on the long-standing debate over life tenure for federal 
judges. We acknowledged that, despite its advantages, life te-
nure creates a serious risk of mental infirmity among elderly 
judges, which threatens the performance and legitimacy of the 
courts. Yet we criticized “command and control” measures like 
mandatory age limits and fixed terms for Supreme Court Jus-
tices, instead recommending less drastic reforms that would 
not require a constitutional amendment.13 Empirical research 
by political scientists and economists, we noted, has demon-
strated that throughout the nation’s history the single strong-
est predictor of judicial retirements is pension eligibility.14 We 
therefore proposed a “golden parachute” for Supreme Court 
Justices, providing strong financial incentives to retire in a 
timely fashion—especially upon experiencing a serious mental 
disability—rather than clinging to office into extreme old age.15 
In Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride Circuit 
Again,16 Professor Stras turned to the workload of Supreme 
Court Justices. He proposed resuscitating the nineteenth-
century practice of “circuit riding” by compelling Supreme 
Court Justices to spend a week or more each year sitting as 
judges on the federal courts of appeals.17 Circuit riding would 
benefit the Justices themselves, he argued, by wrenching them 
from their isolation in Washington and exposing them to other 
judges, lawyers, and communities. He argued that the Court’s 
 
 9. Id. at 1419. 
 10. Id. at 1446. 
 11. Stras & Scott, supra note 3. 
 12. David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, An Empirical Analysis of Life Te-
nure: A Response to Professors Calabresi & Lindgren, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 791 (2007).  
 13. Stras & Scott, supra note 3, at 1426–39. 
 14. Id. at 1447–49. 
 15. Id. at 1455–59. 
 16. Stras, supra note 4. 
 17. Id. at 1735–37. 
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work product would improve if Justices were required, from 
time to time, “to grapple with the gaps or inconsistencies in the 
Court’s contemporary opinions or the challenges faced by lower 
courts in implementing them.”18 Moreover, increasing Justices’ 
workload would also provide a strong incentive to retire in a 
timely manner. Social science research has confirmed a signifi-
cant relationship between federal judges’ workload and their 
retirement decisions. Measures like circuit riding, which would 
make Supreme Court Justices’ work much more demanding, 
therefore can be expected to induce earlier retirement.19  
Another important advantage of Professor Stras’s proposal, 
in my view, is that circuit riding might provide a particularly 
strong retirement incentive for mentally infirm Justices. Today, 
a Justice whose mental health is failing can easily “hide out” in 
Washington, insulated by protective law clerks and Court staff, 
seldom interacting with outsiders. A weeklong stint serving 
with a new slate of judges, however, poses a real risk of public 
embarrassment for a mentally infirm Justice. That makes a 
dignified resignation more attractive. 
Several of Professor Stras’s strengths as a scholar are evi-
dent in his early work. His writing on judicial retirements and 
workload focuses on practical questions—what works?, what 
doesn’t?, what institutional hurdles realistically can be over-
come?—and not just abstract debates about theory and doc-
trine. At a time when much legal scholarship is aimed primari-
ly at other academics, Professor Stras has produced a body of 
work that is of equal interest to judges and lawmakers, devel-
oping and defending concrete proposals for legal change. In ad-
dition, his writing on judicial retirement and workload show-
cases his facility with empirical methods. Not content to 
speculate about how judges will respond to changing incentives, 
from the outset he has grounded his proposals in the kind of so-
cial science research that too many law professors overlook. 
II.  JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS   
Next Professor Stras wrote several articles analyzing 
changes in judicial appointments. In Understanding the New 
Politics of Judicial Appointments,20 he catalogued key structur-
 
 18. Id. at 1731. 
 19. Id. at 1733–34. 
 20. See David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial Ap-
pointments, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1056–78 (2008) (reviewing BENJAMIN 
WITTES, CONFORMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY 
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al, external, and judicial factors that have contributed to in-
creasing politicization of the federal judicial appointments 
process in the last century. One underappreciated structural 
change was the Seventeenth Amendment, which has required 
the direct election of Senators since 1913. Another was an 
amendment to the Senate rules in 1929 to require roll-call 
votes for judicial confirmations.21 Structural changes, including 
the direct election of Senators and roll-call votes and public 
committee hearings on judicial nominees, made Senators di-
rectly and publicly accountable for their votes on judicial nomi-
nations.22 External forces such as interest group lobbying and 
intense media attention now play a powerful role in whether 
the nominee is confirmed to the Supreme Court.23 Meanwhile, 
the judiciary itself has contributed to the politicization of the 
process by injecting itself into hot-button social and political 
questions and thereby raising the stakes of each new confirma-
tion battle.24 Professor Stras dissented from the common view 
that Presidents have caused the confirmation process to become 
more divisive by “selecting ideologically controversial nomi-
nees.”25 Presidents’ “ideologically driven selection” of nominees, 
he argued, is primarily a response to the aggrandizement of the 
power of the federal judiciary, and therefore “more of a symp-
tom than a cause of the new politics of judicial appointments.”26 
In a follow-up article, Navigating the New Politics of Judicial 
Appointments,27 Professor Stras and I extended that analysis to 
the confirmations tug-of-war between the President and the 
Senate.  
III.  SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING   
Most recently, Professor Stras has made two important 
contributions to the empirical literature on Supreme Court de-
 
TIMES (2006) and JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE 
INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT (2007)); see also David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Navigating 
the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1869 (2008) (re-
viewing CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE 
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (2007)). 
 21. Stras, supra note 20, at 1061–62. 
 22. Id. at 1059–62. 
 23. Id. at 1062–66. 
 24. Id. at 1069. 
 25. Id. at 1071. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Stras & Scott, supra note 20. 
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cisionmaking. The first, a study called The Supreme Court’s De-
clining Plenary Docket: A Membership-Based Explanation,28 
traces the dramatic decline in the size of the Supreme Court’s 
docket between 1981 and 2007 to changes in the Court’s mem-
bership. Using the private papers of Justice Harry Blackmun, 
now available at the Library of Congress, Professor Stras gen-
erated a unique new dataset of certiorari votes for every case 
on the Court’s plenary docket between 1986 and 1993.29 The 
data are striking. Different Justices voted to grant certiorari 
“at considerably different rates,” and several new members of 
the Court—Justices Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg—voted to 
grant certiorari at a much lower rate than the Justices they re-
placed.30 Scholars frequently attribute the decline in the Su-
preme Court’s docket to the certiorari pool, the elimination of 
the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction, and changes in the actions 
of the Solicitor General’s office. Professor Stras’s study power-
fully demonstrates that, whatever the influence of those fac-
tors, turnover in the Court’s personnel also has played a central 
role. 
The second, Explaining Plurality Decisions,31 is the most 
comprehensive study to date of plurality decisions on the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Cases that produce only a plurality opinion, 
with one or more opinions concurring in the judgment, have 
come under criticism because they often provide unclear and 
unstable answers to high-profile legal questions.32 Professor 
Stras and coauthor James Spriggs developed a case-level model 
of plurality decisions, identifying a host of ideological, collegial, 
legal, and contextual factors that might contribute to a break-
down in the process of coalition building and compromise ne-
cessary to produce a unified opinion for the Court.33 They 
found, surprisingly, no evidence that ideological factors syste-
matically influence when, or how often, the Court issues plural-
ity opinions.34 Instead, the strongest predictors of a fractured 
Court related are legal and contextual: constitutional interpre-
tation, common law and administrative review cases are more 
 
 28. David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Declining Plenary Docket: A 
Membership-Based Explanation, 27 CONST. COMM. 151 (2010). 
 29. Id. at 153. 
 30. Id. at 155–58. 
 31. James F. Spriggs II & David R. Stras, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 
99 GEO. L.J. 515 (2011). 
 32. Id. at 518. 
 33. Id. at 532–43. 
 34. Id. at 545. 
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likely to produce a plurality opinion, while cases reviewing cir-
cuit splits in the lower courts are less likely to produce a plural-
ity opinion.35  
These studies mark Professor Stras’s transition from a 
consumer to a producer of first-rate empirical work on the Su-
preme Court. That evolution should come as no surprise, given 
his long-standing joint appointment in the political science de-
partment and his regular contributions to the Empirical Legal 
Studies blog. In an increasingly interdisciplinary world, he has 
proven himself capable both as a legal scholar and as a social 
scientist. 
IV.  JUSTICE STRAS   
But here’s the irony. For all of their strengths, Professor 
Stras’s articles do not read as if they were written by an aspir-
ing judge. To the contrary, they mostly treat judges as objects 
of study and objects of manipulation. 
Professor Stras’s research frequently places judges under 
the microscope as objects of study. His work reflects a keen in-
terest in the factors, conscious and unconscious, that influence 
judicial decisionmaking. And he has never hesitated to engage 
the political science literature that emphasizes the role of 
judges’ attitudes and strategic choices. His research on the Su-
preme Court, for example, has demonstrated that Justices’ 
ideological values, turnover of Court membership, and collegial-
ity can concretely affect judicial outcomes. Judges rarely ac-
knowledge those influences. 
His scholarship also cheerfully encourages legislatures to 
manipulate judges. In his work on judicial retirements, he has 
championed an “incentives approach.” He proposes, for exam-
ple, enhancing Supreme Court Justices’ retirement benefits 
(through a “golden parachute”) while ratcheting up their work-
load (through circuit riding), as a way of inducing mentally in-
firm Justices to leave the bench in a timely manner. Judges 
seldom embrace that kind of carrot-and-stick approach to their 
own decisions. 
To put it mildly, that is an unusual background for a newly 
minted Justice. But I predict that Professor Stras’s distinctive 
perspective on judicial decisionmaking will serve him well on 
the court. His familiarity with the distorting effects of ideology, 
honed by years of research, gives him an unusual ability to rec-
 
 35. Id. at 547–48. 
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ognize and avoid them.36 And his calls for reform, especially his 
proposals for workload and retirement incentives, reveal a 
healthy sense of the judiciary’s limited role in the constitution-
al design. I trust, as he repairs from Mondale Hall to the Judi-
cial Center, that Professor Stras will retain the intellectual ri-
gor, curiosity, and modesty that have made him an outstanding 
scholar and collaborator.  
On behalf of the many law professors he leaves behind, I 
wish Justice Stras congratulations. Enjoy life on the other side 
of the microscope. We look forward to scrutinizing your every 
move in the years to come. 
 
 36. E.g., Stras & Scott, supra note 20, at 1873–74, 1879. 
